Climate re-shuffle is making Russia reconsider its approach towards the Arctic region. In the past, Moscow pleased ice melting, for it would facilitate the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources.
The Russian Federation, ever since Vladimir Putin first entered the Kremlin in 2000, never hid its deep interest in the Arctic region. Throughout the last decade, numerous official documents have been released to lay out Russia’s policy upon the Arctic. In 2008, a paper titled “Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond” set out two important policy strands. Firstly, it points at the Arctic as a “macro-region” over which Russia wields sovereign jurisdiction. Secondly, it highlights Moscow’s exclusivity over the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources within its continental shelf in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS disposals. In this regard, in 2014 the Russian Federation adopted a State programme for the Arctic named “Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone up to 2020”, which, atop other things, set out the federal budgeting. In 2017, the document was revised and the funding recalculated for the period 2020-2025.
The geoeconomic importance of the region for the Russian Federation can be better understood by looking at its hydrocarbon resources. According to the 2008 US Geological Survey, the Arctic contains about 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 44 billion barrels of Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) and 90 billion barrels of oil for the vast majority offshore. In particular, analysts suggest that more than half of all the region’s estimated oil and gas falls within Russian territories, thus accounting for two-thirds of Russia’s total hydrocarbon resources. Over the years, the milder climate has made these resources easier to exploit for Russian oil and gas majors – Rosneft and Gazprom – which have set off numerous projects, part of them in cooperation with foreign companies, in order to boost both extraction and production. Although challenging from an engineering point of view, high oil prices, especially in the first half of the 2010s along with the predicted decline of Russian inland production, have made Arctic resources ever more profitable.
On the international stage, Moscow’s renovated interest in the region produced two consequences. On one hand, the confirmation of Russia as the second-largest oil producer in the world with 546,8 mln tonnes of oil (including NGL) produced in 2017. On the other, it raised concerns over its role in tackling climate change and the overall reduction of CO2 emissions. Indeed, despite having signed the Paris Agreement (COP 21) in 2016, Russia never made decisive steps towards the implementation of neither climate emission cut targets nor incentives for sustainable development. In this regard, ENERDATA reports that Russia has the second most energy-intensive economy worldwide and it is the fourth-biggest greenhouse emitter. Moreover, between 2011 and 2015 Russia has requested the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to assess the legal delimitation of its external Arctic border, thus demanding the right for exploration and exploitation way beyond the standard 200 nm of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Should the UN CLCS judge it positively, Russia would be granted the opportunity to widen its range of action across the Arctic, stretching out its thirst for hydrocarbons all the way to the North Pole. In this regard, the UN CLCS has recently declared that the outer limits of the Russian continental shelf submission are geologically similar to “the structure of the continuation of the shelf and the continent of the Russian Federation”, thus it apparently works in favor of Russian allegations.
However, more recently Russia has begun to reconsider its approach towards climate change and its consequences. In particular, as ice melting is reducing Arctic’s “load-bearing capacity” – that is the “maximum average weight the soil can carry without displacements” – of the permafrost above which extraction and refinery facilities are built. In the Yamal Peninsula for example, which is home of extremely expensive oil and gas infrastructures such as the Yamal LNG, the Bovanenkovo gas field and the Novy Port oil field, the load-bearing capacity is forecast to drop by 25%-to-50% by 2015-2025 compared with the 1965-1975 period according to a 2017 report published by the Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP). Climate change may not represent an immediate danger for the newest projects as developers insist pipelines and facilities such as those in the Yamal peninsula are built with climate change in mind. Yet, an unexpected increase in temperatures could generate disastrous outcomes for the oil and gas industry. For this reason, Moscow is substantially changing its mind with regard to sustainable development as testified by the sudden ratification of the Paris Agreement.
Indeed, last summer marked a breakthrough in Russian understanding of climate change. Melting permafrost surely represents a real concern for Arctic regions as Aysen Nikolaev, head of the federal Russian republic of Yakutia, told the Financial Times, but unfortunately, it was not the only tangible effect of rising temperatures. The world will not easily get over the huge wildfires that swallowed up more than 12 hectares of the Russian forest. Last June, in Yekaterinburg in the Urals, Vladimir Putin warned that Russia was warming up 2.5 times quicker than in the past. Under the Paris Agreement, Russia would have to limit emissions to 70% to 75% of baseline levels by 2030, not an easy task at all. For this reason, the last 24th of September, Prime Minister Medvedev decided to sign a government resolution obviating Duma’s approval. This way, he managed to deprive obstructionists of the possibility to reject the ratification, highlighting Kremlin’s resolution to the new environmental track it has undergone.
Despite government statements, critics point at the increased oil production in the Arctic and tax relief packages that have been implemented to push fields development. Meantime, the Northern Sea Route linking Siberia to the Far East is registering record-breaking cargo shipments due to an increase in the duration of the ice-free season, and providing Russian oil and gas majors an outlet other than Europe. In conclusion, the Kremlin’s turnaround shall not mislead. Even though Russia is seeking to diminish its environmental footprint, it will be part of a process of adaptation to climate change rather than mitigation of its effects. In this sense, its Arctic policy fits perfectly with the overall paradigm.
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